Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal
Volume 10 | Issue 1

Article 9

1992

Keeping Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
Intact: A Fresh Look at Worker Participation
Committees Through Electromation, Inc.
Steven I. Locke

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Locke, Steven I. (1992) "Keeping Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA Intact: A Fresh Look at Worker Participation Committees
Through Electromation, Inc.," Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal: Vol. 10: Iss. 1, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol10/iss1/9

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Labor
and Employment Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact
lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Locke: Keeping Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA Intact: A Fresh Loo

KEEPING SECTIONS 2(5) AND 8(a)(2) OF THE
NLRA INTACT: A FRESH LOOK AT WORKER
PARTICIPATION COMMITTEES THROUGH
ELECTROMATION, INC.
Increasing competition from abroad1 has sent many United
States companies searching for innovative measures to restore themselves to a competitive level in the international marketplace. 2 Specifically, American companies 3 have been seeking to emulate some of
the successful management techniques employed in Japan, as well as
several other industrialized countries,4 such as Germany, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden.5 One such technique
used is the "worker participation committee." 6 Although the implementation of worker participation committees vary in form, their
general purpose is to provide avenues of communication between
employers and employees in order to create a more participatory
management style and shed the industrial malaise that seems to be
hindering firm productivity.7

1. Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation:The Uncertain Significance of
Section 8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499, 499 (1986).
2. Note, Special Project: Alternatives to the United States System of Labor Relations: A
Comparative Analysis of Labor Relations Systems in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,
and Sweden, 41 VAND. L. REV. 627, 628 (1988).
3. Among the United States firms presently using some form of the worker participation
committee model are AT&T, Boeing, Caterpillar, Cummins Engine, Delta Airlines, Digital
Equipment, Disney, Ford, General Electric, General Motors, Harley Davidson, Hewlett-Packard,
Honeywell, IBM, 3M, McDonald's, Motorola, Nordstrom, Proctor & Gamble, Sara Lee,
Tektronix, Texas Instruments, Xerox, and Walmart. Brief for the Amicus Curiae, Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America at 4, Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163
(No. 25-CA-19818)(1992).
4. See William B. Gould, Reflections on Workers' Participation, Influence and
Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 381 (1988).
5. Charles B. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First
Century, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 677 (1983).
6. See e.g., Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for the Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 2024-26 (1987)
(discussing several different types of worker participation committees such as the quality of
work-life committees, the quality control circle, and the Scanlon plan).
7. Id; Curtiss K. Behrens and James R. Sollenberger, The National Labor Relations
Act: A Potential Legal Constraint Upon Quality Circles and Other Employer-Sponsored Employee Committees, 34 LAB. L.J. 776, 776 (1983).
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While there are numerous forms of worker participation committees,8 two types generally predominate: (1) the quality control circle;
and (2) the quality of work-life committee.9 Quality control circles
tend to focus on improving both the quality of the final product and
the production process itself."0 Each circle, typically consisting of a
small number of workers from a given department and members of
management, considers a limited scope of issues relevant to that department.11 Normally, a single plant will have several circles.' 2 The
underlying premise is that giving the worker input into decisions
regarding the production process will not only increase productivity
directly, but also increase job satisfaction such that there will be a
new dedication to producing a better final product. 3
Quality of work-life committees are set up in a fashion similar to
that of the quality control circles, but focus specifically on the quality
of the work environment as opposed to the end product. 14 The ultimate goal of these committees is to increase employee job satisfaction
by giving employees some measure of control over their environment,
and consequently, have the employees become more committed to
their jobs."s This, in turn will lead to increased productivity. 6 For
the purposes of this paper, all types of worker participation committees ("WPC's"), including quality control circles and quality of

8. See supra note 5.
9. See Andrew A. Lipsky, Comment, ParticipatoryManagement Schemes, the Law, and
Workers' Rights: A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 667, 672-75
(1990)(discussing direct participation by an employee on the board of directors as well as the
implementation of quality control circles and quality of work-life committees); Robert B.
Moberly, Lecture, New Directions in Worker Participationand Collective Bargaining, 87 W.
VA. L. REV. 765, 775-80 (1985); Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model
in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021, 2024-26
(1987).
10. W. OUCHI, THEORY Z; How AMmECAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE, 261 (1981).
11. IL at 262-63.
12. Id
13. Andrew A. Lipsky, Comment, Participatory Management Schemes, the Law, and
Workers' Rights: A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 667, 672-75
(1990)(discussing the notion that quality control circles will: (1) directly increase productivity
because the person who is best able to decide the most efficient way to complete a task is
the employee who does it for a livelihood, and (2) indirectly increase productivity because
the more control the employees have over the final product, the more committed the employees will be to their jobs, and the more efficient they will be).
14. Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 83 U. MICH. L. REv. 1736, 1739-40 (1985).
15. L
16. Id
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Electromation, Inc.

work-life committees, will be treated similarly, and are assumed to
share the following characteristics: (1) they will meet regularly, during work time, without loss of pay to employees, (2) they will be
composed of a small group of employees and a representative of
management, who does not in any way preside over or control the
meetings, and who does not set the agenda, and (3) participation in
these groups by employees is strictly voluntary.
American firms who choose to implement WPC's face a serious
legal obstacle in the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). 7 Specifically, the WPC's may be in danger of violating
sections 8(a)(2)1 8 and 2(5). 1"
On December 16, 1992, the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") handed down Electromation, Inc.,2 dealing with precisely
this issue. The facts, which are not in dispute,2 as found by the
administrative law judge, are set out briefly. Electromation, Inc. is a
business in Elkhart, Indiana that manufactures small electric and electronic products.' The company consists of approximately five departments with a total of two hundred employees.23 From late 1987
through 1988, several ad hoc committees were formed by management to discuss
matters of mutual interest between management and
24
employees.
By the end of 1988, Electromation, Inc., having financial diffi-

17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2)(1988); See e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360
U.S. 203 (1959)(affirmimg a cease and desist order of the NLRB, where the Board found
that "employee committees" and the "central committee" were "labor organizations" pursuant
to NLRA § 2(5) and that respondent, in violation of § 8(a)(2) had dominated, interfered with,
and supported these groups). For cases dealing with similar issues see also Hertzka &
Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); Sea Life, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 982 (1969);
Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977); General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232
(1977); NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982);
Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955); NLRB v. Wemyss, 212
F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (Ist Cir. 1979);
NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1984).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 15 8(a)(2)(1988). For the text of the statute, see infra, note 123 and accompanying text.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)(1988). For the text of the statute, see infra, note 62 and accompanying text.
20. 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, appeal docketed, No. 92-4129 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1992).
21. See e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief for the Chamber of Commerce Brief at 3-4,
Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, (No. 25-CA 19818)(1992); Amicus Curiae Brief
for the Council on Labor Law Equality at 2-7, Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163,
(No. 25-CA-19818)(1992).
22. Electromation, Inc., Case No. 25-CA-19818, N.L.R.B., ALJ slip. op. at 3 (1990).
23. Id
24. Id
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culties, 2s made the decision to cut expenses wherever possible.2 6
One such cost cutting plan was aimed at controlling absenteeism by
offering financial rewards for consistent attendance.27 Additionally,
general wage increases for the following year were cut.28 These
plans were announced to the employees on December 23, 1988, and
then the plant was shut down until January 2, 1989.29
When the plant reopened, employees began complaining about
the new policies. 30 Consequently, management held a meeting on
January 11, 1989 during which it listened to the employees' complaints. 1 The employees that attended were selected by management
from a pool of high and low seniority employees and were accompanied by two other employees who were allowed to participate at their
own request. 2 With the eight employees present, 33 a number of
topics were discussed. Among them were: overtime, tardiness, wages,
4
bonus attendance, bereavement leave, sick leave, and incentive pay.
Upon the conclusion of this meeting, management realized that it
may have made some errors with its previous cuts, and wanted to
solve the problem by forming separate ad hoc committees to focus on
specific problems.35 On January 11, 1989, management presented its
new plan to the same people who attended the January 11 meeting.36
The plan broke down employee concerns into five areas. 7 Each area
would have its own "action committee," composed of employees and
representatives of management. 8 Management would then analyze
the recommendations of these action committees in light of budget
constraints, and then implement the recommendations as it felt was
appropriate.39 The subjects of the five action committees were: (1)
absenteeism/infractions, (2) no smoking policy, (3) communication
25. Id
26. Id at 3-4.
27. Id at 4.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id
31. Id
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id
35. Id at 3. It should be noted that this idea of using ad hoc committees was not new
to Electromation, Inc. As previously mentioned, similar committees had been set up in 1987

with similar functions. Id
36. Id at 4-5.
37. Id at 5.
38. Id
39. Id
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network, (4) pay progression for premium positions, and (5) the attendance bonus program.'
41
The plan was then presented to the employees. Each committee was to consist of as many as six hourly employees and one or
two management level employees.42 Employees who wished to participate only had to volunteer by means of a sign up sheet.43 Selection of participants was to be made by management from the list of
volunteers." Ultimately, there was no over-enrollment from which to
choose.4" The committees were overseen by one person, Loretta
Dickey, who was rarely active at any of the meetings.46
The committees were scheduled to meet weekly, and employees
were paid for their time at these meetings.47 The meetings were held
in the company conference room and writing materials and a calculator were supplied by the company. 4g At the meetings, the management representatives did not set the agenda, and everyone participat49

ed.

The committees continued to meet until the end of February,
when Dickey was informed that a union was seeking to organize the
plant.-" Under the advice of counsel, Dickey told each of the committees that management could no longer participate, but the employees could continue to meet without loss of pay if they so desired."1
The union demand for recognition occurred on February 13,
1989.52 The parties executed a stipulation for election on March 3,
and the election was held on March 31." The union lost the election and filed suit, claiming that the employer committed an unfair
labor practice, violating section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, by forming and
maintaining the action committees. Although, no evidence presented
showed either explicitly or implicitly, that the action committees were
in any way a response to a union campaign, or that the employer

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id at 6.
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
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even knew that such a campaign existed,-4 the ALl agreed with the
union and held,
The fact of whether or not the Company knew of its employees'
Union activities does not, however, alter the legal effects of the
Company's actions. I have found that the Action Committees are
labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act provides in pertinent part that it is an
unfair labor practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it."
The Board has found domination by an employer where the employer organized the functions, nature and structure of employee committees, supervisors conducted committee meetings, meetings took
place on Company premises, supplies and materials used were donated by the Company, and committee members were paid for time
spent conducting committee business.
The facts as set out above show that all but one of these factors
were present in the formation and operations of the Action Committees. I do not think there is any question that, after the two
informational sessions on January 11 and 18, the Company organized the Committees. Their functions, nature and structure were
purely the creation of management. The meetings took place on
Company property. Supplies and materials were supplied by management. Committee members were paid for their time spent at
Committee meetings. The only missing factor is the supervisor domination of the discussions at the meetings. This criterion is not controlling, and I find that the Company dominated these (or this) labor
organizations [sic] from their inception.55
The respondents filed an appeal to the ALJ decision and oral
arguments were held on September 5, 1991.56 On December 16,
1992, the NLRB affirmed the ALU's decision noting that,
These findings rest on the totality of the record evidence, and they
are not intended to suggest that employee committees formed under
other circumstances for other purposes would necessarily be deemed
"labor organizations" or that employer actions like some of those at
54.

Id at 7.

55. Id
56. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 1, appeal docketed, No. 92-4129 (7th
Cir. Dec. 28 1992).
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issue here ould necessarily be found, in isolation or in other cons
texts, to constitute unlawful support, interference or domination. 5

The Board then fails to offer any guidelines as to when a worker
participation committee will definitely be considered an unfair labor
practice." The two issues on the appeal that will serve as the focal
point of this paper are:
(1) Whether the worker participation committees are
"labor organizations" as defined by section 2(5)
of the NLRA, 59 and
(2) Whether the employer "dominated or interfered"
with the "administration or formation of" or
"contributed" support to these "labor organizations.

'6°

SECTION 2(5)

AND THE CABOT CARBON DOcnUNE

Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA prohibits interference with a "labor
organization., 61 The term "labor organization" is defined by Section

2(5) as,
any organization of any kind, or agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists
for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work.62

Section 2(5) basically requires that three conditions be satisfied
in order for a group to qualify as a labor organization: (1) there must
be some kind of representation of employees by agents, (2) the committee must have the purpose of "dealing with" the employer, and (3)
the committee must deal with a subject regarding wages, hours, or

57. Ia at 2.
58. Barabara Franklin, The Committee Question- No Clear Answers from NLRB in
"Electromation," 208 N.Y. L.J. No. 122, 5 (Dec. 22, 1992).
59. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)(1988)(defining the term "labor organizations").
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1988)(defining unfair labor practices).
61. Id
62. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)(1988).
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working conditions. 63 The condition that has led to much litigation
in the past, and
a split in the circuits, is the definition of the term
64
with."
"dealing
Originally, the term "dealing with" was broadly defined in 1959
when the Supreme Court reversed the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co.65 In Cabot Carbon, there was no issue over whether the WPC's involved were
"dominated or interfered with" under section 8(a)(2); they clearly
were.' The determinative issue was whether or not the WPC's were
"labor organizations" under section 2(5).67
The employer in Cabot Carbon developed its version of worker
participation committees in response to the War Production Board's
policy of encouraging the development of such committees during the
Second World War.68 The purpose of the policy was to increase productivity in order to support the war efforts.69 After the war ended,

the committees remained intact, and more were added as new plants
opened.70 According to the by-laws of the Cabot Carbon Committees, the purposes of these committees were:
1. To bring about a better understanding between employees in
every branch and service of [the] Company to the end
that each will have a better insight of the other's problems.
2. To provide a definite procedure for considering employees'
ideas. As an example, the following problems are of
mutual interest to employees and management:
a. Safety.

63. See id
64. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th
Cir. 1982); NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381 F.2d 61 (3d Cit. 1967); NLRB v.
Newman-Green, Inc., 401 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1968); NLRB v. Stow Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900
(2d Cir. 1954); Wayside Press, Inc., v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 862 (9th Cit. 1953).
65. 360 U.S. 203 (1959), rev'g, Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir.
1958), denying enforcement, Cabot Carbon Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1633 (1957).
66. The circuit court, which ultimately found in favor of the employer, admitted that if
the worker participation committees were labor organizations within the meaning of section
2(5), then there would have been a section 8(a)(2) violation. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB,
256 F.2d 281, 282 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
67. Id
68. Cabot Carbon Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1633, 1640 (1957), enforcement denied, 256 F.2d
281 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
69. Id
70. Id at 1642.
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b. Increased efficiency in production.
c. Conservation of supplies, materials and equipment.
d. Encouragement of ingenuity and initiative.
e. Grievances ..

71

Additionally, the "Functions of the Committee":
do not in any way detract from the authority of management but
should assist plant management in general to solve problems of
mutual interest at regular monthly and special meetings called by
management by (1) working with management on those problems of
mutual interest as set out under "Purposes"; (2) making recommendations on [sic] the suggestions from employees in accordance with
the suggestion plan set forth in the Cabot Guide; and (3) handling
grievances at nonunion plants and departments according to established grievance procedure, reporting troublemakers and acts of
disturbance, and insisting that gripes, grumbling, and troublemaking
either stop or be taken up under the regular grievance procedure.72
About ten years after the war ended, the International Chemical
Workers Union, who represented some of the employees at some of
Cabot Carbon's plants, accused Cabot Carbon of committing several
unfair labor practices, including violating section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA
by maintaining its employee committees.'
The Board, adopting the trial examiner's recommendations,
agreed with the union and held that the employee committees were
"labor organizations" within the meaning of section 2(5) and their
maintenance violated section 8(a)(2). 74 While the Board noted that
the employee committees did not engage in any outright collective
bargaining, the committees' stated purposes and functions were sufficient to make the employee committees "labor organizations."75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied
enforcement of the Board order, holding that Congress intended to
recognize employee rights to discuss areas of mutual interest with
their employer without the intervention of the collective bargaining
representative,76 provided there was no conflict with the collective

71. Id at 1640.
72. Id at 1642.
73. Id at 1636-37.
74. Id at 1653.
75. Id at 1646.
76. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S.
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bargaining contract. 77 In arriving at its decision, the court relied on
section 9(a) of the NLRA, which provides,
Representatives... selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit... shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees... for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any
individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such
grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of the collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in
effect . .

.7

After examining the legislative history of section 2(5), the Fifth Circuit determined that the term "dealing with" was equivalent to the
term "bargaining with. '79 Therefore, in accordance with the rest of
section 2(5), for the employee committees to be labor organizations,
the employees involved had to be representing the other employees,
and engaged in bargaining with the employer."0
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit"
reasoning that the term "dealing with" meant something broader than
the term "bargaining with."82 Consequently, the court held that Cab-

203 (1959).
77. Specifically, the court held,
We cannot come to any other conclusion than that the Senate and House conferees
intended to recognize the right of groups of employees to discuss with their employer matter of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment,
and working conditions. Congress saw this right as existing independently of the
right of bargaining representatives to speak for their labor organization. Further,
Congress intended - contrary to the practice of the Board - that employees would
have the right to have their grievances settled without the intervention of a bargaining representative, provided that there was no conflict with a collective bargaining contract. The conferees explained what they were doing and Congress approved
it.
Id at 288.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1988).
79. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 1958), rev'd, 360 U.S.
203 (1959).
80. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)(1988).
81. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959), rev'g, Cabot Carbon Co. v.
NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958).
82. To define the term "dealing with" as something broader than the term "bargaining
with,- the Court looked to the legislative history of the statute:
When the original print of the 1935 Wagner bill (S. 1958) was being considered
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ot Carbon's employee committees were labor organizations within the
meaning of section 2(5), in spite of the seemingly contradictory provisions of section 9(a).83
In Electromation, the NLRB revitalized the Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of section 2(5), 4 (which is implicitly coupled
with its dismissal of the Fifth Circuit's analysis of Section 9(a)) leaving virtually no room for the legal existence of any type of WPC
outside the scope of the NLRA.s However, in spite of the Supreme
Court's expansive reading of section 2(5), the Sixth Circuit, as well
as the NLRB have developed some inroads into the Cabot Carbon
Doctrine which are worth consideration.86
NEW TRENDS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2(5)
In 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit began to set
limits on the scope of the Cabot Carbon Doctrine in NLRB v.
Streamway Division of the Scott & Fetzer Co." In Streamway, the
employer established a worker participation committee whose goal
"was to provide an informal yet orderly process for communicating
company plans and programs; defining and identifying problem areas
and eliciting suggestions and ideas for improving operations." 8 The
in the Senate, the then Secretary of Labor proposed an amendment to section 2(5)
which, if adopted, would have given that section the meaning now ascribed to it
by the Court of Appeals. The proposal was that the term "bargaining collectively"
be substituted for the term "dealing." But the proposal was not adopted. It is
therefore quite clear that Congress, by adopting the broad term "dealing" and rejecting the more limited term "bargaining collectively," did not intend that the
broad term "dealing with" should be limited to and mean only "bargaining with"
as held by the Court of Appeals.
The court was relying on a comparison of S. 2926 (73d Cong.) and S.1958 (74th
Cong.) 1, 22-23, reprinted in, 1 LEG. HisT. (1935) 1320, 1347.
Id at 211-12 (citations omitted).
83. Id at 218.
84. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 18-26, appeal docketed, No. 92-4129 (7th
Cir. Dec. 28, 1992).
85. See, e.g., Sea Life, Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 982 (1969); Walker Process Equip., Inc., 163
N.L.R.B. 615 (1967).
86. See, e.g., NLRB v. Strearway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th
Cir. 1982)(holding that a worker participation committee isnot a "labor organization" under
NLRA § 2(5)). For cases addressing similar issues, see also Airstream, Inc., v. NLRB, 877
F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); Northeastern Univ., 218 N.L.R.B. 247 (1975); Mercy-Memorial
Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977); General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977); Sparks
Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), modified sub nom., NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623
F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981).
87. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
88. The Court described the framework for the employee committees as follows:
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employees involved would serve on a rotating schedule.8 9 The goal
of forming the committees in this fashion was to "provide ... as
many employees as possible [with an] opportunity [for] direct input. " 'r The function of this employee committee was quite similar to
that of a quality control circle.91
After a suit was filed against the employer for committing an
unfair labor practice, the NLRB found that the employee committee
was a "labor organization" within the meaning of section 2(5), and
that the employer violated section 8(a)(2) by dominating and interfering with the committee's formation.' The United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed.93 The court relied heavily on
the reasoning Judge Wisdom's dissenting opinion in a similar case,
NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co.,94
To my mind an inflexible attitude of hostility toward employee
committees defeats the act. It erects an iron curtain between employer and employees, penetrable only by the bargaining agent of a
certified union, if there is one, preventing the development of a
decent, honest, constructive relationship between management and
labor. The act encourages collective bargaining, as it should, in

Initially, one general meeting and one departmental meeting in each of the four departments in the Company was to be held each month. The committee was to
include eight employee representatives, and management personnel would be present
at both general and departmental meetings.
[Four representatives] were to be elected from six categories of Assembly employees, with not more than one representative from each category; two were to be
elected from the Machine Shop; one was to be elected from the "Polish and Buff"
Department; and one was to be elected from the "P & I Control" Department.
[The m]anagement representatives for general meetings were to include the Vice
President of Operations, the Manufacturing Manager, P & I Control Manager and
the Personnel Manager. The various departmental meetings were to include either
the Vice President of Operations and Manufacturing Manager or the Vice President
of Operations and P & I Control Manager.
Id. at 289-90.
89. The initial terms were to be six months with all terms thereafter lasting for three
months each. Id at 290.
90. Id
91. Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 83 U. MICH. L. REv. 1736, 1751 (1985); See supra notes 6-13 and
accompanying text.
92. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 249 N.L.R.B. 396 (1980), enforcement
denied, 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
93. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
94. 289 F.2d 177, 182 (5th Cir. 1961).
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accordance with national policy. The Act does not encourage compulsory membership in a labor organization. The effect of the
Board's policy here is to force employees to form a labor organization, regardless of the wishes of the employees in the particular
plant, if there is so much as an intention by an employer to allow
employees to confer with management on any matter that can be
said to touch, however slightly, their "general welfare". There is
nothing in Cabot Carbon, or in... any other law that makes it
wrong for an employer "to work together" with employees for the
welfare of all. There is nothing wrong - provided that the committee through which the employer and employees work is not in fact
a labor organization within the meaning of Sections 2(5) . . .and

8(a)(2) and is not used by the employer to infringe on labor's right
and other rights in violation of Section
of self-government
8(a)(1). 9-'
The Sixth Circuit then cited several factors that influenced its
decision. Among those factors were: (1) the rotation of the employee
committee members to ensure many workers would get on opportunity to participate, and to make the committee less of a representative
process, (2) the lack of anti-union animus on the part of the employer, and (3) the lack of effort to use the existence of the committee as
a bar to the two organizational campaigns of the union.9'
In a later case, Airstream, Inc., v. NLRB, 97 the Sixth Circuit
again limited the scope of the Cabot Carbon Doctrine. In Airstream,
during a union organizational campaign, the president of the company
set up an advisory committee, composed of employees and management, that would meet once a month and give the president questions
and suggestions.9" At the first meeting, the president took sugges-

tions but said that he could not act on any of them until after the
union election was over.99 In response to an unfair labor practice
charge under section 8(a)(2), the Sixth Circuit held the committee was
not a labor organization," reasoning,
Airstream took no action during the course of the Union campaign
either at an [advisory committee] meeting or as an announced consequence of such a meeting that could reasonably be construed to

95. Id
96. Streamway, 691 F.2d at 294-95.
97. 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989).
98. Id at 1294.
99. Id at 1295.
100. Id at 1295-96.
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involve hours of employment, conditions of work, or the settling or
handling of grievances or employee disputes. The basic function
continued to be101as a means of communication between management
and employees.
The court then distinguished Cabot Carbon stating that in Airstream,
the committee was set up in an advisory capacity, while in Cabot
Carbon, the committees were formed to resolve grievances and "discuss matters covering nearly the whole scope of the employment

relationship. '""°2
In addition to the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, there have also been several board decisions which have set limitations on the Cabot Carbon Doctrine. 3
These limitations can be broken down into two categories: t°4 (1)
cases where the employer delegates power, 5 and (2) cases where
there is no actual representation involved. 1°6 In Sparks Nugget,
Inc., °7 the employer formed a council of "impartial" employees to
hear grievances concerning employees who had problems with their
supervisors, and give resolutions to these problems.'
The commit-

101. Id at 1296.
102. Id (quoting NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 208 (1959)). Specifically,
the court noted,
The basic function [of the Airstream committee] continued to be a means of communication between management and employees. In Cabot Carbon the employer
prepared committee by-laws for adoption by the employees, which were adopted
and published in a company manual. The "handling of grievances" was specifically
included as a purpose of the by-laws, and there followed proposals on "seniority
job classifications, job bidding, makeup time, overtime records, time cards, merit
system, wage corrections, working schedules" and the like.
Airstream, 877 F.2d at 1296.
103. Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), enforced in part and denied in part
sub nom., NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
906, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981); Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977);
General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 933 (1977); Fiber Materials, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 933
(1977).
104. See Note, ParticipatoryManagement Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 83 U. MIcH. L. REv. 1736, 1753 (1985).
105. See e.g., Sparks Nugget, Inc., 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), enforced in part and denied
in part sub nom., NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 906, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 931 (1981); Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108
(1977).
106. See e.g., General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977); Fibers Materials, Inc., 228
N.L.R.B. 933 (1977); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
107. 230 N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), enforced in part and denied in part sub nom., NLRB v.
Silver Spur Casino, 623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906, reh'g denied,
452 U.S. 931 (1981).
108. Id at 275.
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tee essentially acted as a panel of arbitrators."°
The Board ultimately held that the grievance committee was not
a "labor organization" within the meaning of section 2(5), and distinguished Sparks Nugget from Cabot Carbon,
In Cabot Carbon,... the organizations in question "dealt with"
the... employers in some sense as the employer advocates. Here,
however,. . . the [employee committee] performs a purely adjudicatory function and does not interact with management for any purpose or in any manner other than to render a final decision on the
grievance. Therefore, it cannot be said that the [employee committee] herein "deals with" management; Rather it appears to perform a
function for management; i.e. resolving employee grievances. Accordingly, we conclude that, inasmuch as the [employee committee]
is not a labor organization, Respondent's conduct in instigating,
dominating, and assisting said [committee] was not unlawful under
Section 8(a)(2) of the Act." °
In Mercy-Memorial Hospital Corp.,"' the facts were quite similar. An employee committee was formed to allow employees more
participation in the grievance procedure."' The committee was basically an arbitration panel whose decision was binding on the hospital,
but appealable by the employee.1 3 The Board held that this grievance committee was not a "labor organization" using a reasoning
similar to that applied in Sparks Nugget, Inc.,

Mhe committee was created simply to give employees a voice in
resolving the grievances of their fellow employees,... not by presenting to or discussing or negotiating with management but by
itself deciding the validity of the employees' complaints and the appropriateness of the disciplinary action, if any, imposed." 4
In General Foods Corp.,"5 the employer divided all the employees into teams with each team acting on its own consensus to

109. William P. Schurgin, The Limits of Organized Employer-Employee Relations in NonUnion Facilities: Some New Evidence of Flexibility, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 615, 624 (1981).
110. Sparks Nugget, at 276. For a more detailed discussion of Sparks Nugget, see
Schurgin at 623-25.
111. 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
112. ld at 1119.
113. Id at 1118.
114. Id at 1121. For a more detailed discussion of Mercy-Memorial Hosp., see Schurgin
supra, at 625-28.
115. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
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attack a variety of problems." 6 The administrative law judge found
that these teams were not "labor organizations" within the meaning of
the Act, because there was no "representation" of the employees inn7
volved.
The Board affirmed the AL's decision noting that when an
employee spoke directly to the employer, he did so on his own behalf, not as a representative of his co-workers.'
Therefore, when
an employee went directly to the employer to discuss a matter of
mutual concern, his actions were covered by the section 8(a)(2) provi19
so.

1

In the more recent case of Sears, Roebuck & Co.," 0 the Board
held that an employee participation committee designed to facilitate
communication between the employees and employer was not a "labor
organization.'' The Board relied on the fact that employees selected to serve on the committee did so on a rotational, rather than representational basis, and that the purpose of the committee was to give
input to help solve problems with management.'
SECTION 8(a)(2)

Now that the case law defining the term "labor organization" has
been discussed, it is necessary to determine when employer interaction
with a labor organization constitutes an unfair labor practice. Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA provides,
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer.., to dominate
or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it: Provided, That
subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board
pursuant to section 6, [29 U.S.C. § 156] an employer shall not be
prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during
working hours without loss of time or pay ... 123
In order to gain an accurate understanding of section 8(a)(2) of
the NLRA, it is useful to understand the circumstances from which

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id at 1233-34.
Id at 1234-35.
Id
Id See infra, note 123 for the text of the section 8(a)(2) proviso.
274 N.L.R.B. 230 (1985).
Id at 244.
Id
29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2)(1988).
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the statute evolved. The NLRA was enacted after the Supreme Court
struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act,124 which was a
Congressional attempt to protect employee rights to choose their own
collective bargaining representative."2 5
Employers reacted to the enforcement of the NLRA by forming
their own "company unions." 2 6 Between the years 1932 and 1933
alone, "the number of employees covered by company unions rose
from 432,000 to 1,164,000, an increase of 169 percent. 7 By the
fall of 1933, a study showed that only 9.3 percent of employees were
represented by trade unions while 45 percent were enlisted in company unions. 2 Given these statistics, it is logical that Congress reacted by passing section 8(a)(2).
Senator Wagner, "the key figure in the development of labor
legislation," ' 9 for whom the Act was named, described the problem
124. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)(striking down the National Industrial Recovery Act as unconstitutional).
125. National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 195, 15 U.S.C. § 707 (repealed
1935).
126. Company unions are described by Cox et al. in LABOR LAW, eleventh edition:
"Company unions" consisted essentially of two distinct types. Until the early
1930's the prevailing form involved the use of joint committees on which both
employee and management unilaterally promulgated and implemented the plan,
often in response to an "outside" organizational effort. Generally consisting of
numbers of employee and management representatives with equal voting power,
these committees functioned primarily as a forum for discussion and consultation;
final decisional authority over the committees' recommendations usually remained in
management ....
The prototype post-NIRA version of the company union- or employee
committee, as they are also known-made provisions for separate meetings of
employee representatives, reserving meetings with management only for presentation
of proposals and discussion. (This supposedly made the plans less subject to challenge on grounds of interference or restraint; nevertheless, it was customary for
management representatives to be present at all meetings to give information and
advice) . . . . Management, however, instigated the committee's

formation,

and

usually framed its constitution and by-laws, presenting them to employees for ratification. Although employees usually elected their representatives, candidates were
restricted to current company employees, and often minimum age length-of-service
requirements were imposed. Representatives' terms were normally of limited duration.
ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 200-01 (11th ed. 1991).
127. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Council on Labor Law Equality at 8, Electromation,
Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163 (No. 25-CA-19818)(1992)(quoting 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230
(1934))(statement by Sen. Wagner), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATWE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 23 (1985)).
128. Id
129. Raymond L. Hogler, Worker Participation,Employer Anti-Unionism, and Labor Law:
7Te Case of the Steel Industry, 1918-1937, 7 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 37 (1989).
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as follows,
At the present time genuine collective bargaining is being thwarted
immeasurably by the proliferation of company unions. Let me state
at the outset that by the term "company union" I do not refer to all
independent labor organizations whose membership lists embrace
only the employees of a single employer. I allude rather to the
employer-dominated union, generally initiated by the employer,
which arbitrarily restricts employee cooperation to a single employer
unit, and which habitually allows workers to deal with their employer only
through representatives chosen from among his employ130
ees.

Senator Wagner also noted that one purpose of the Act is to
promote cooperation within labor, and then by cooperation, labor
would have enough strength to deal with management on equal
ground.13' It was the Senator Wagner's opinion that only a position
of equal strength could effectuate cooperation between labor and
management. 3 1 In describing section 8(a)(2), Senator Wagner explicitly stated that its purpose was not to invalidate all types of employee committees,
The new bill forbids any employer to influence any organization
which deals with problems such as wages, grievances, and hours.
They should be covered by a genuine labor union. At the same
time, the bill does not prevent employers from forming or assisting
associations which exist to promote the health and general welfare
of workers or to provide group insurance, or for similar purposes.
Employer-controlled organizations should be allowed to serve their
proper functions of supplementing trade 133unionism, but they should
not be allowed to supplant or destroy it.
Similar descriptions of the purpose of Section 8(a)(2) are echoed in

130. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Council on Labor Law Equality Brief at 9,
Electromation, Inc., No. 25-CA-19818 (1992)(quoting 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230
(1934)(statement of Dr. William M. Leiserson), reprinted in, I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 23 (1985)).
131. See infra, note 133.
132. See id.
133. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Council on Labor Law Equality Brief at 10-11,
Electromation, Inc., Case No. 25-CA-19818 (quoting 78 CONG. REc. 4229, 4230 (1934)(article
written by Senator Wagner), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS AcT, 1935, at 25 (1985)).
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the final Senate report on this part of the Act.' 34
THE PER SE APPROACH TO SECTION 8(a)(2)
Like the term "dealing with" in section 2(5) of the NLRA, the
terms of section 8(a)(2) have also given broad interpretations in several jurisdictions and by the NLRB.1 35 The Supreme Court, in the
Bernhard-Altmann case, similarly adopted a broad interpretation,
thereby increasing the potential for employer violations.t 36 In
Bernhard-Altmann, a union organizational campaign was occurring
simultaneously with an economic strike to protest a wage reduc134. The final Senate report states,
This bill does nothing to outlaw free and independent organizations of workers
who by their own choice limit their cooperative activities to the limits of one
company. Nor does anything in the bill interfere with the freedom of employers to
establish pension benefits, outing clubs, recreational societies, and the like, so long
as such organizations do not extend their functions to the field of collective bargaining, and so long as they are not used as a covert means of discriminating
against or in favor of membership in any labor organization. Such agencies, confined to their proper sphere, have promoted amicable relationships between employers and employees and the committee earnestly hopes that they will continue to
function ....
The so-called 'company union" features of the bill are designed to prevent interference by employers with organizations of their workers that serve as collective
bargaining agencies. Such interference exists when employers actively participate in
framing the constitution or by laws of organizations; or when, by provisions in the
constitution or by laws, changes in the structure of the organization cannot be
made without the consent of the employer. It exists when they participate in the
internal management or elections of a labor organization or when they supervise
the agenda or procedure of meetings. It is impossible to catalog all the practices
that might constitute interference, which may rest upon subtle but conscious
econimc pressure exerted by virtue of the employment relationship. The question is
one of fact in each case. And where several of these interferences exist in combination, the employer be said to dominate the labor organization by overriding the
will of employees.
S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 2309 (1985). It should be noted that in
his concurring opinion, Member Devaney acknowledged that the Congressional intent behind
section 8(a)(2) was to regulate company unions rather than employer initiated worker participation committees. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 42, appeal docketed, No. 924129 (7th Cir. Dec. 28 1992) (Devaney, Member concurring).
135. See, e.g., NLRB v. Perfect Circle Co., 162 F.2d 566, 573 (7th Cir. 1947)(stating,
-The employer may not avoid the consequence of its interference, restraint and coercion,
whatever may be its motive."); NLRB v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 128 F.2d 528, 533 (6th
Cir. 1942); NLRB v. Industrial Cotton Mills, 208 F.2d 87, 91 (4th Cir. 1953); Ona Corp.,
285 N.L.RLB. 400 (1987); Alta Bates Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. 485 (1976); Clapper's Mfg., Inc.,
186 N.L.R.B. 324 (1970).
136. ILGWU v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) [hereinafter Bernhard-Altmann].
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tion." 7 The two events were unrelated. 13 8 Some of the strikers
signed authorization cards and the union began to negotiate a settlement with the employer. 1 9 During these negotiations, the employer
recognized the union as the exclusive bargaining representative of the
employees and agreed to make certain wage improvements and changes in conditions of employment in return for ending the strike. 4 At
this time, neither the employer, nor the union checked to insure that
the union did indeed have a majority of authorization cards. 4 ' It
was later found by the Board, that during the negotiations, the union
did not have the employees' majority support, although later, at the
time a formal collective bargaining agreement was signed, the union
did have the requisite majority support. 42
The Court held that under section 9(a)'43 the NLRA "guarantees employees freedom of choice and majority rule,"' t 4 and the
opposite occurred in this case; the minority chose the representative. 4 This was a clear "abridgement of section 7' '146 and a violation of section 8(a)(2), 147 because the employer "contribute[d] ...
137. Id, at 733.
138. Id
139. Id at 733-34.
140. Id at 734.
141. Id
142. Id at 734-35.
143. Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides,
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by
the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a
group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances to their
employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms
of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further,
That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
29 U.S.C. § 159(a)(1988).
144. Bernhard-Altmann, 366 U.S. at 737.
145. Id
146. Section 7 of the NLRA provides,
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to formjoin, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any
or all such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)(1988). For the text of section 8(a)(2), see supra note 123 and
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support" to a labor organization. 148 The Court, responding to the
employer's contention that his acting in good faith is a complete defense, continued,
We find nothing in the statutory language prescribing scienter as an
element of the unfair labor practices here involved. The act made
unlawful by section 8(a)(2) is employer support of a minority union.
Here that support is an accomplished fact. More need not be shown,
for even if mistakenly, the employees' rights have been invaded. It
follows that149prohibited conduct cannot be excused by a showing of
good faith.
The holding in Bernhard-Altmann left behind the rule that it is interference per se for an employer to grant recognition to any labor
organization when that organization is not a reflection of the majority
choice of the employees in the bargaining unit.15
In addition to the per se application of section 8(a)(2) in
Bernhard-Altmann, the Board has also shown itself willing to find
section 8(a)(2) violations in an almost mechanical fashion. 151 In Alta
Bates Hosp.,52 the Board ordered an employee committee to be dissolved due to the AL's finding of "domination" in the "formation"

accompanying text.
148. Bernhard-Altmann, 366 U.S. at 737-38.
149. Id at 739 (citations omitted).
150. Brief for the Amicus Curiae, Charles J. Morris, at 48, Electromation, Inc., Case No.
25-CA-19818 (1991); Note, ParticipatoryManagement Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 83 U. MICH. L. REV. 1736, 1748 (1985)(discussing section
8(a)(2) interpretation as a per se ban on employer involvement in some courts and NLRB
decisions). E.g., NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 974 (1974).
The holding of Bernhard-Altmann was really a reiteration the earlier Supreme Court
decision, NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939). In
Newport News, the employer had an employee participation committee and a reputation for
peaceful dealings with that committee and no anti-union animus. After the NLRA had been
sustained by the Supreme Court, the employer tried to maintain the committee in a form it
felt would best comply with the Act. However, because the employer retained the right to
veto any changes to the by-laws governing the committee, the Supreme Court found the committee "dominated" within the meaning of section 8(a)(2). This small degree of power retamed by the employer was enough to deprive the employees of the rights guaranteed them
by the NLRA. The employer's long history of peaceful relations with committee was inconsequential, as was the lack of anti-union animus. Id at 251. The NLRB relied heavily on
Newport News in its Electromation analysis to find that the employee commitees were 8(a)(2)
violations. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 26-28, appeal docketed, No. 92-4129
(7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1992).
151. Alta Bates Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. 485 (1976); Wahlgreen Magnetics, 132 N.L.R.B.
1613 (1961); Ona Corp., 285 N.L.R.B. 400 (1987).
152. 226 N.L.R.B. 485 (1976).
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and "administration" of the worker participation committee. ' The
Board found "domination" because the employer first introduced the
idea of the committee, helped plan it, contributed a meeting place and
office supplies, kept a veto power over amendments to the by-laws,
and maintained management representatives comprising one-third of
the committee.154 An 8(a)(2) violation was found in spite of the fact
that the employees voted on who represented them55 and that their
representatives made up two-thirds of the committee.'
Similarly, in Wahigreen Magnetics,"s the Board dissolved an
employee committee pursuant to a finding of an 8(a)(2) violation. 7
The Board relied on the employer first introducing the idea of the
employee committee and developing the representation scheme of the
employees."5 Also, while the employees chose their own representatives,159 the employer maintained a rule that any employee representative who was transferred, lost his representative status."6 Finally,
the employer set up a meeting schedule, and provided a room, and
paid the employees for the time spent at committee meetings.' 6'
In a more recent case, Ona Corp.,62 the Board adopted the
ALI's finding of domination of the employee committee based on the
employer's first coming forward with the idea for the committee and
helping to form it, the employer's choosing the topics of discussion,
the employees being paid for their time, and the employer providing
the room and supplies for the meeting. 63 Once again, in
Electromation, Inc. the NLRB has applied this per se rule to the
worker participation committee. 164 However, in doing so, the Board
has done so in spite of some recent developments in the law in several United States Circuit Courts.'6

153.

Id at 490-91.

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id
Id
132 N.L.R.B. 1613 (1961).
Id at 1619-20.
Id
Id
Id
Id
285 N.L.R.B. 400 (1987).

163. Id at 406-07.
164. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 23-28, appeal docketed, No. 92-4129 (7th
Cir. Dec. 28, 1992).
165. See infra, notes 166-208 and accompanying text.
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A LEss RIGID INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 8(a)(2) 6

Although several United States Circuit Courts have adopted a per
se test for applying section 8(a)(2), other Circuit Courts have adopted

a less rigid approach."6 In Chicago Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v.
NLRB,"~ the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
avoided the per se approach to section 8(a)(2), and adopted a test that
focuses on whether or not the employer actually dominated the labor
organization. 169 Although the NLRB explicitly declined to follow
Seventh Circuit's lead in Electromation, it did so only by dropping a
footnote which stated that the two cases were distinguishable giving
little reason for this conclusion.17 ° Because the Seventh Circuit's
analysis has received so much support in other courts, it still merits

166. Council on Labor Law Equality Brief at 28-29, Electromation, Inc., No. 25-CA19818, points out that, "It is critical to delineate between conduct which is unlawful
assistance or interference and that which is illegal domination" of a labor organization. This
is because although both constitute violations of section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, only conduct
constituting "unlawful domination" requires "disestablishment of the organization." As the
brief points out, these terms have been used interchangeably by the courts when they should
not be, and this has served to confuse the law on the matter. See e.g., NLRB v. Dennison
Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 1080, 1082 (lst Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1023 (1970); NLRB
v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1963); Jafco, a Div. of Modem
Merchandising, Inc., 284 N.L.R.B. 1377 (1987).
For the purpose of this section, the paper will be focusing on cases where the issue is
whether or not the WPC's involved were dominated within the meaning of section 8(a)(2),
such that the remedy would be to force the WPC to disband.
167. See, e.g., Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir.
1955)(adopting an "actual domination" test as opposed to applying a per se approach to section 8(a)(2)). For other examples of application of the "actual domination" test, as well as
other lower standards applied under section 8(a)(2); see also Coppus Eng'g v. NLRB, 240
F.2d 564 (1st Cir 1957); Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cit. 1967);
Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875
(1975); NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535 (6th Cit. 1984); NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (Ist Cir. 1979); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915 (6th
Cir. 1968).
168. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
169. Id. at 168 (emphasis in original).
170. The Board simply states that in Chicago Rawhide, the employee committee was
formed at the impetus of the employees and that while the case is distnguishable from
Electromation, no "passing on the merits" would be done here. Electromation, Inc., 309
N.L.R.B. No. 163, 28, n.25, appeal docketed, No. 92-4219 (7th Cir. Dec. 28 1992). Member
Raudabaugh, in his concurring opinion gives Chicago Rawhide, more attention, arguing that
per se test, first handed down in Newport News, and reiterated in Bernhard-Altmann is still
the applicable precedent, and without more, the Seventh Circuit's analysis is inappropriate. Id
at 87-89 (Raudabaugh, Member concurring).
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serious consideration.17'
In Chicago Rawhide, the employer operated several unorganized
plants."7 In 1950, at a new plant, the employer set up a "system"
for handling grievances.173 When the employees found this system
unsatisfactory, they complained to the employer, and the two parties
sat down and developed a new system. 174 This new system called
for the formation of two committees composed of employees and
representatives of management, which later merged into a single committee. 7 s The employer let the committee meet during working
time, and contributed money on several occasions to social activities
organized by the committee to help defray the cost. 17 6 In 1951, the
International Fur and Leather Workers' Union tried to organize the
plant without success."7 The union then filed suit
against the em7
ployer for violation section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA.1 1
179
The Board, using the per se test, found an 8(a)(2) violation.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,'
holding,
Words and actions which might dominate the employees in their
choice of a bargaining agent do not constitute domination proscribed
by the Act unless the employees are actually dominated. The
employer-employee relationship itself offers many possibilities for
domination, which is one of the reasons for the original enactment
of the Wagner Act, but actual domination must be shown before a
violation is established ....
The test of whether an employee
organization is employer controlled is not an objective one but
rather subjective from the standpoint of the employees.' 81
As the Seventh Circuit continued to employ the test adopted in

171. See e.g., Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d
625 (9th Cir. 1974).
172. Id at 167.
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id
176. Id at 167-68.
177. Id
178. Id at 168.
179. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., 105 N.L.R.B. 727 (1953), rev'd sub nom., Chicago
Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
180. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
181. Id at 167-68 (citations omitted, emphasis added).
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Chicago Rawhide,182 several other Circuit Courts began applying the
same test.'83 In Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB,' the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that just because a labor organization was "weak," (had no formal constitution or by-laws by which to
operate, no property, and no source of income, no dues, and meetings
were held at the plant) did not mean that a violation of section
8(a)(2) had occurred. 18 5 "Evidence of a weak labor organization ...
does not show that the Company exerted a subtle and insidious control over ignorant or protesting employees."' 6 The Sixth Circuit
then adopted the holding of Chicago Rawhide,"7 "actual domination
test," and noted that the committee was the desire of the employees,
and they were free to refuse any of the services of the committee
without fear of reprisal."8 8 The court concluded by stating that the
prime purpose of the NLRA "is to foster peace through collective
bargaining" and that the employee committees in this case worked for
many years to achieve that goal.'89 In short, using the Chicago
Rawhide "actual domination test" enabled the Court to facilitate the
"prime purpose" of the NLRA, as opposed to the Board's per se test,
which would have achieved a result contrary to that goal.' 90
In NLRB v. Northeastern University,'9' the employees, acting
on their own, with the employer's blessing, created an employee
committee whose members were elected by the employees."9 The
committee operated under its own by-laws and its purpose was to
"promote harmonious working relationships between staff and university; provide for an exchange of information ... relating to staff
problems; sponsor social activities; [and] give.., staff ... input into ... university policy affecting the staff." 193 The committee met
in a university room, had no source of income, and general costs

182. See, e.g., NLRB v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963).
183. See e.g., Modem Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967); NLRB v.
Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d
625 (9th Cir. 1974).
184. 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967).
185. lit at 204.
186. L
187. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1955).
188. Modern Plastics Corp., 379 F.2d at 204.
189. IL
190. See id
191. 601 F.2d 1208 (lst Cir. 1979).
192. Il at 1211.
193. IL
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were absorbed by the university.' ' Although the committee never
negotiated a formal collective bargaining agreement, it did influence
the "terms and conditions of staff employment."195
In response to an unfair labor practice charge, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reiterated that the Chicago Rawhide test
relying on actual domination, was more appropriate than the Board's
per se test, relying on potential domination."9 The Court then held
that just because the employer facilitated the committee's work by
providing a room and absorbing some of the expenses does not mean
that domination under section 8(a)(2) actually occurred.'97
In Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB,' 9' the Organization of Architectural Employees ("the union") filed an unfair labor practice against
the employer for violation of section 8(a)(2).' 99 After the union lost
a decertification election, the employer requested suggestions on how
to "accomplish a management-employee dialogue." 2" An employee
suggested a system of committees composed of employees and a
representative of management.2"' The suggestion was approved
"overwhelmingly. ' 2 °2 The purpose of the committee was to "discuss
and formulate proposals for changes in employment terms and conditions." 3 Meetings were sometimes held on company time without
loss of pay, and on some committees the management representative
voted while not on others."°
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in interpreting the
purpose of section 8(a)(2) looked to Senator Wagner's comments
regarding that section,
Nothing in the bill prevents employers from maintaining free and
The only prohibition is
direct relations with their workers ....

194. Id at 1212.
195. Id
196. See Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1957)(adopting the Chicago Rawhide test); NLRB v. Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1964); NLRB
v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 419 F.2d 1080 (Ist Cir. 1969)(applying the Chicago Rawhide test and
finding actual domination by the employer); NLRB v. Reed Rolled Thread Die Co., 432 F.2d
70 (1st Cir. 1970)(applying the Chicago Rawhide test).
197. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d at 1212-13.
198. 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974).
199. Id at 626.
200. Id at 629.
201. Id
202. Id
203. Id
204. Id
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against the sham or dummy union which is dominated by the employer, which is supported by the employer, which cannot change
its rules and regulations without his consent, and which cannot live
except by the grace of the employer's whims.' 5
The court then adopted the Chicago Rawhide "actual domination
test ''206 holding, that the "employer must be shown to have interfered with 'the freedom of choice' of the employees" and that the
employer actually dominated the committee. 2 7 Because there was
no evidence of "actual domination" the Ninth Circuit reversed the
NLRB's decision.0 8
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

In the last decade, the use of economic analysis as a tool for
analyzing legal matters has been propelled to prominence in the academic community by the law and economics school of thought.2"
While the validity of applying economic models, based on arguably
shaky assumptions to the law is widely debated, 20 the application
of the most basic model for developing a demand curve for labor
makes a compelling argument in support of adopting the Chicago
Rawhide test when applying section 8(a)(2) and 2(5) of the NLRA.
The easiest way to understand this basic model is to develop it
step by step. An employer's demand for inputs (i.e. capital and labor)
is a derived demand. 2 ' It is derived from consumer's demand for
the firm's product.212 For the purposes
of this paper, only three of
the most basic assumptions apply.2 13 The first two are: (1) that the

205. Id. at 630 (quoting STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION 278-79 (R. Koretz, ed. 1970)(remarks of Feb. 21, 1935)).

206. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1955).
207. Hertzka & Knowles, 503 F.2d at 670.
208. Il
209. See, e.g., Barrett, Influential Ideas: A Movement Called Law and Economics Sways
Legal Circles, WALL ST. J., Aug 4, 1986 at 1 col. 1, 16 col. 2.
210. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to Rational
Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (1989); Richard A. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics: A Comment on Ellickson, 65 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 57 (1989); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism,
60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
211. DON BALLANTE & MARK JACKSON, LABOR ECONOMICS, CHOICE IN LABOR MARKErS, 17 (1983).
212. ld.
213.

See RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS,

THEORY AND PUBUC POLICY, 50 (2d ed. 1985).
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employer seeks to maximize its profits, 2 4 and (2) the firm employs
only two factors of production, labor and capital. 2 5 Therefore, output ("Q") is a function of ("f") labor ("L") and capital ("K").
Q=f(L,K).
The final assumption is that the law of diminishing returns applies.2 16 The law of diminishing returns, in terms of the application
of this model, states that while one input is fixed (i.e. capital), each
additional unit of labor input added will yield ever shrinking quantities of additional output.2 17
The easiest way to illustrate this notion is with an example. An
employer owns a farm. His capital is one tractor (which is fixed).
The employer can hire one farmer to operate the tractor. This will
increase output substantially. Hiring a couple of other farmers might
allow the tractor to be operated in shifts for longer periods of time,
thereby increasing productivity. However, there is still a limited number of workable hours in a day, and if the first farmer was working
more than half of them, this new increase in output will be less than
the initial one. From this point on, additional farmers would have to
work by hand since the tractor is already in constant use. Therefore,
their pace of production would be slower. Theoretically, eventually so
many farmers could be hired that they would crowd each other, increasing output by ever declining amounts.
Given that each employer is profit maximizing, it is clear that
for a given budget constraint,218 he will try to choose his proportion
2" 9 The budget
of inputs such that maximum profit will be 22yielded.
0
k'l'.
by
A-1
Graph
in
constraint is represented
214. In order to maximize profits, a fum must attain two related goals: (1) it must produce each quantity of output at the lowest attainable cost, cost-minimization, and (2) the
output level chosen must be neither too large nor too small. BERTON M. FLEISHER & THOMAS J. KNEISNER, LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY, 45 (1984).
215. E.g., ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK AND PAY, 55-56 (1979); EHRENBERO
& SMITH supra note 213 at 50-51.
216. RicHARD B. FREEMAN, LABOR ECONOMICS, 63 (1979); F. RAY. MARSHALL ET AL.,
LABOR ECONOmICS, WAGES, EMPLOYMENT, AND TRADE UNONISM, 217-18 (1976).
217. Id at 63.

218. An employer's "budget constraint" is his fixed amount of funds set aside for the
costs of inputs. The budget constraint is also referred to as an "isoexpenditure line,"
EHRENBERG & SMITH supra note 213 at 89, or an "isocost line," FLEISHER & KNEISNER
supra note 214 at 61.
-219. See FLEiSHER & KNEisNER supra note 214 at 61 and accompanying text (discussing
profit maximizing behavior of employers).
220. The budget constraint is straight, reflecting fixed labor and capital costs, which an
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I

L

Graph A-1

employer in a competitive market has no ability to affect. FLEIsHER & KNISNER supra note
214 at 61-62. While this assumption is used as a starting point for this model, it is subsequently relaxed as the discussion progresses. Consequently, because discussing different market
forms would be a complex endeavor which would not serve to further elucidate the issue at
hand, these market forms are not addressed here.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1992

29

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 9
Hofistra Labor Law Journal

[Vol. 10:1

The vertical axis represents the amount of capital employed
while the horizontal axis represents the amount of labor. The locus of
points denoted kT represents the maximum expenditure possible, as
allocated between varying proportions of capital and labor that can be
employed, given a fixed budget.
To further develop the model, several "isoquant lines"
("isoquants") must be added." Isoquants are loci of points representing varying proportions of capital and labor that could produce
given amounts of output.'m The three main characteristics of the
isoquants that should be noted are their negative slopes,223 their
convexity," and that they do not intersect.2"s The isoquants are
represented in Graph A-2 as Q, Q' and Q", 226
and are superimposed on
the budget constraint depicted in Graph A-1.

221. EHRENBERG & SMITH supra note 213 at 82-87.
222. Id
223. The isoquants' negative slopes reflect the assumption that labor and capital are substitutes. So if an employer cut his use of labor, he could still produce the same amount of
output as before by employing more capital. EHRENBERG & SMrTH supra note 206 at 83.
224. The isoquants' convexity reflects the application of the law of diminishing returns. If
an employer starts by using relatively more capital to produce his output, as he decreases his
use of capital, he will need ever increasing amounts of labor to keep output constant. Id at
83; FLEISHER & KNEISNER supra note 213 at 53.
225. See, e.g., Id at 82-89; FLEIsHER & KNEISNER supra note 214 at 53-56. The reasons
for the isoquants not intersecting are beyond the scope of this paper.
226. Note that Q'>Q'>Q. Therefore, production at any point along Q" will yield more
output than production at any point along Q'. Similarly, production at any point along Q'
will yield more output at any point along Q. Additionally, there is an infinite number of
isoquants, each of which complies with the assumptions discussed supra notes 223-225 and
accompanying text. See id at 82-89; FLEISHER & KNEISNER supra note 214 at 53-56. For the
purpose of this simplified illustration, Graph A-2 depicts only the three isoquants, Q, Q' and

Q.
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As long as we assume that the employer is a profit maximizer, 27 the desired output is represented by point C.228 Given the
budget constraint k'l',, 29 the employer could allocate his budget between capital and labor so as to wind up anywhere within triangle
k'l'O.' However, because profit maximization also implies cost
minimization, the employer will seek to produce the most output at
the least cost. 1 To produce the maximum output, the employer
will seek to operate along the budget constraint.232 Choosing points
A or B would not be cost minimizing behavior. This is because operating at points A or B will have the employer engaged in maximum
spending without obtaining maximum output. 33 Specifically, production at points A or B would yield only Q output. However, by choosing to employ the combination of inputs k* 1*, where Q' is tangent
to k'l', the employer will be spending the same amount of money as
he would if he chose inputs at k** 1** but will be yielding extra
output in the amount of Q,.Q.21 It is at this point that the employer accomplishes his goals of profit maximization and cost
minimization.235
It is this issue of choosing at which point along the budget constraint to operate that is most pertinent to the Electromation case and
the use of WPC's. The model reveals that the employer wants to
operate at the point where the highest possible isoquant is tangent to
the budget constraint.' However, the model does not explain how
the employer gets to this point. To do so, the employer will first
have to determine his costs. In the model, these costs are limited to
expenses for labor and capital. 7 Because we are only interested in
labor costs, these expenses will be loosely referred to as the wage,
and the costs of capital will not be discussed. The wage consists not

227. See FLEISHER & KNEIsNER supra note 214 and accompanying text.
228. See EHRENBERG & SMrrH supra note 213 at 86-87 (discussing conditions of cost
minimization using isoquants and isoexpenditure).
229. See FLEISHER & KNEiSNER supra note 220 and accompanying text.
230. - See id. at 60-62.
231. Id at 62-65.
232. See EHRENBERG & SMITH supra note 213 at 86-87.
233. See Id
234. Id Cost minimization will ultimately occur at the point where the slope of the
isoquant, the marginal rate of substitution, is equal to the slope of the budget constraint/isoexpenditure line and the two are tangent. See id at 86-87; FLEISHER & KNEISNER
supra note 214 at 62-65 (giving a mathematical explanation for the occurrence).
235. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 221-235 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
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only of pure financial compensation, but also benefits ranging from
contributions to pension plans238 and medical insurance 39 to absorption of child care costs.2"
The key to determining the wage rate that an employer faces
will be based on the employer getting an accurate understanding of
employee desires. The issue at hand is to decide what mechanism
best serves this end, as well as which mechanisms the law allows.
Clearly from an economic perspective, the law should facilitate the
employer's understanding of the costs it faces so that it may make
the most efficient choices. If the employer does not have an accurate
understanding of employee desires, inefficiencies may develop, ranging from unnecessary duplication of health benefits within dual income families,24 to giving each employee salary increases when an
employee child care arrangement may be sufficient and cheaper. Additionally, the job satisfaction that employees gain from having input
into the employers' business decisions might give the employees a
higher sense of dedication to their jobs, making them less likely to be
selfish and perform more efficiently in the face of difficult financial
times.242
Given the potential for inefficiencies developing due to an employer making choices based on inaccurate information, section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA should not be construed to per se invalidate all
WPC's, regardless of their effect. The result of such case law would
be to hinder communication between employers and management,
leading employers to make irrational choices. This will leave firms
operating at a point such as point A on Graph A-2, when they should
be operating at point C. This inefficiency, in the aggregate, will ultimately lead to higher costs and lower levels of production, which in

238. See Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan Terminations in
the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 25, 27 n.1 (1991)(discussing
trends in coverage of employees by private pension plans).
239. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Nondiscrimination in Employee Benefits: False Starts and
Future Trends, 52 TENN. L. REV. 167, 169 (1985)(discussing employer contributions to medical insurance policies).
240. See Christine A. Clark, Comment, Corporate Employee Child Care: Encouraging
Business to Respond to a Crisis, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1987)(discussing the possibility of private employers providing for employee child care costs in the state of Florida).
241. The inefficiency here lies in the notion that if both spouses work, and both receive
incomplete coverage under their employers' respective health insurance plans, they will both
want more complete coverage. However, if the avenues of communication are closed, the
employers might wind up paying more to increase coverage, thereby increasing their labor
costs, where changing to cafeteria plans might accomplish the same ends with no extra costs.
242. See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
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turn contribute to the lack of American competitiveness in the international marketplace. Given that the purpose of section 8(a)(2) was to
avoid employers dominating labor organizations,-"3 and not to pre244
vent employers promoting the general welfare of their companies,
it seems unreasonable for the courts to accommodate such an inefficient result. The Chicago Rawhide test is the only legal device that
will allow the courts to avoid this consequence while remaining true
to the policies underlying the NLRA.
It should also be noted that in the event that an employer does
actually interfere with or dominate a WPC, under the Chicago Rawhide test, finding that WPC unlawful is consistent with the economic
model. Inasmuch as employer domination or interference distorts the
employees' true desires, the "advice" that grows out of these committees will be inaccurate, leading the employer to make inefficient
choices. Theoretically, this distortion of once accurate information will
have the same effect as if the WPC had never existed. The distorted
information will lead to inaccurate decisions ultimately hurting the
firms efficiency, and thereby productivity. The greater the degree of
domination or interference by the employer is, the further point A on
Graph A-2 will be from point C and the more efficiency and produc245
tivity will suffer.
ELECTROMATION, INC.

The facts of Electromation, Inc. 246are such that the Board's
decision could have resolved the controversy that surrounds sections
2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. Rather than do this, the Board simply
revitalized the Cabot Carbon Doctrine247 keeping the definition of
the term "dealing with" broad, declining to use the reasoning of the
Sixth Circuit in Streamway? 8 and Airstream, Inc. 2 49 The NLRB,

243. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
244. Id
245. See supra notes 221-235 and accompanying text. The further point A is from point

C, the greater the difference between Q and Q'. Therefore, the result is less output for the
same amount of inputs.
246. 309 N.L.R.B. No.163, appeal docketed, No. 92-4129 (7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1992). See
supra, notes 20-58 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 61-86 and accompanying text.
248. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982);
See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
249. Airstream, Inc., v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th 1989); See supra notes 97-102 and
accompanying text.
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in similar fashion, employed the per se approach250 to section
8(a)(2), rather than adopting the Chicago Rawhide "actual domination
test." 1 However, in arriving at its decision, the Board specifically
2
limited the decision to its facts without offering any guidelines.
The first decision that confronted the Board was whether or not
Electromation's "action committees" are labor organizations within the
meaning of section 2(5).253 To make this choice, the Board had to
decide upon the appropriate definition of the term "dealing with," as
it is used in section 2(5).254 In reaching its conclusion, the NLRB
correctly recognize that the Supreme Court's interpretation of section
2(5) is the most logical one. While the two exceptions to the Cabot
Carbon Doctrine handed down in Mercy-Memorial Hosp.215 and
General Foods Corp.256 are logical, they should remain isolated, and
applicable only to cases with similar facts. The Sixth Circuit's ap5 7 and Airstream, Inc.,25 1
proach to section 2(5) in Streamway
while they yield the desired result, create bad law. By shrinking the
definition of the term "labor organization" in order to allow for the
existence of WPC's is an invitation to problems with respect to section 7 rights. The ultimate result will be that employers will be allowed to infiltrate, interfere and dominate the WPC's without a fear
of retribution because the employee-members of these "non-labor
organization" WPC's will be stripped of a major avenue for recourse
under the NLRA. By excluding these WPC's from the status of "labor organizations" under section 2(5), the Board would be placing
WPC's beyond the scope of section 8(a)(2), thereby depriving the
employees serving on these committees of the right to bring unfair
labor practice charges for domination of interference with the formation or administration of those committees. In short, the effect of
confining the Cabot Carbon Doctrine, in an effort to facilitate the use
of WPC's, and thereby increase productivity in general, would be to

250. See supra notes 135-165 and accompanying text.
251. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955); See supra
notes 166-208 and accompanying text.
252. See supra, notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
253. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5)(1988). For the text of the statute see supra, note 60 and accompanying text.
254. l
255. 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977).
256. 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977).
257. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982);
See supra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
258. Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); See supra 97-102 and
accompanying text.
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diminish employee rights under section 8(a) by emasculating section
8(a)(2). Not only is this idea contrary to the underlying policy of the
act, it is completely unnecessary.
If the NLRB was looking to promote the use of WPC's in order
to make U.S. firms more competitive, as it should be, but wants to
remain consistent with the intentions of the Act, then the Board
should readjust its approach to section 8(a)(2)(not section 2(5)) and
abandon the per se approach in favor of the Chicago Rawhide "actual
domination test." By applying this test, the Board can confront the
WPC's and their surrounding circumstances either by creating guidelines, or deciding on a case by case basis if section 8(a)(2) has been
violated. This test seems infinitely more logical than issuing a cease
and desist order, in the mechanical fashion used by the Board in
Electromation, to a WPC which has lived up to its purpose of keeping the channels of communication open and promoting a peaceful
work environment, but which also meets once a month in the company conference room without the employees losing their pay. By using
the Chicago Rawhide test, the Board would be able to weigh the
functions of the committee against the employer exertion of influence
over that committee, and determine whether or not the existence of
the WPC is consistent with section 8(a)(2) of the Act.
Additionally, an economic analysis" 9 reveals that applying section 8(a)(2) in a per se fashion is inefficient where the WPC is being
used to facilitate communication between management and workers,
so that management may make more rational decisions based on
accurate information. Inasmuch as an application of the NLRA forces
employers to make choices based on inaccurate information, U.S.
production in the aggregate suffers. The use of Chicago Rawhide test,
however, allows employers to obtain necessary information to make
business decisions and maintain a higher level of efficiency while at
the same time preventing abuse of the WPC's by employers who
dominate them, promoting inefficiency and causing production to
26
suffer. 0
Although an adoption the Chicago Rawhide test might appear to
be the beginning of the end for unions, nothing should be further
from the truth. In fact, given the intention of the legislature when
drafting section 8(a)(2),261 the only logical conclusion is that the

259. See supra notes 209-245 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 236-245 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 129-134 and accompanying text.
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most efficient way for the WPC to operate is against the backdrop of
a union. If there is a union for the employees to turn to in the event
that the employer begins taking advantage of the members of the
WPC's, as a practical matter employees rights are much more likely
to be easily exercised and vigorously protected. The threat of the
union intervening to make sure that the employees' section 7 rights
are enforced should also act as a countervailing power to that of the
employer and should have a deterring effect on any employer ideas
regarding domination or interference with the WPC's.
This point, of course, begs the question, "What if the plant is
unorganized?" To deal with this situation, the Board should set out
specific guidelines. However, it is reasonable to conclude that if the
employer begins to dominate the WPC, in the unorganized shop, the
employees are free to seek out the help of a union. As soon as the
employee seeks the union's help, he is exerting his section 7 rights,
and the employer will have to withdraw from the WPC. Otherwise,
his participation would be considered assisting one labor organization
over another under section 8(a)(2), and an unfair labor practice.262
Although it is true that this course of events will cause employees to
join a union against their original desires, it still leaves the employees
an option to enforce their rights under section 8(a)(2). Additionally,
the possibility of the employees seeking to organize the plant when
they otherwise would not, should deter the employer from acting to
dominate or interfere with the WPC.
Given the facts of Electromation, Inc.,263 the Board correctly
found that the "action committees" are labor organizations within the
meaning of section 2(5). Whether or not the "action committees"
were "dominated" or "interfered with" is not as clear a decision.
However, the Board should not simply decide that just because the
"action committees" were formed on the impetus of the employer,
and meetings were held at the plant, using company office supplies,
without loss of pay, that a violation of section 8(a)(2) has automatically occurred. 2" The Board, when making its decision, should have
applied the Chicago Rawhide "actual domination test" and consider
that these committees had been used in the past by the employer
when no organizational campaign was being conducted, and that the
employer stopped participating in the "action committees" as soon as

262.
263.
264.
92-4129

See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2)(1988). Bernhard-Altmann, 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
For a summary of the facts, see supra notes 20-58 and accompanying text.
See Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 28 n.24, 36, appeal docketed, No.
(7th Cir. Dec. 28, 1992).
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it heard of the union's attempt to organize the plant. Any other decision will further develop a body of case law which promotes inefficiency within American firms by promoting business decisions based
on inaccurate information. This in turn will serve, not only to hurt
those firms faced with labor issues individually, but ultimately U.S.
productivity in the aggregate, and American competitiveness in the
international market place.
Steven L Locke
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